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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Annual Report 2006-2007

  1. Deliver an Effective Regulatory Program for Existing Facilities
  2. Effectively Manage Growth of the Regulatory Program
  3. Implement Improvement Initiatives

The CNSC identified, in a risk-informed manner, the following three priorities in its 2006-07 Report on Plans and Priorities:

1. Deliver an effective regulatory program for existing facilities

The CNSC's efforts to deliver an effective regulatory program for existing facilities and to implement improvement initiatives are discussed in greater detail, under Next Page Part IV- Program Activities and Contribution to the CNSC's Strategic Outcomes.

2. Effectively manage growth of the regulatory program

The CNSC has identified five major growth areas in its regulatory program:

  1. Nuclear power reactor refurbishment projects
  2. Uranium mining, research facilities and waste management
  3. Licensing and compliance of the use of nuclear substances
  4. Litigation of risks to nuclear security
  5. Creation of a modern regulatory framework for construction of new nuclear reactors in Canada

The increase in the CNSC's workload is the result of growing nuclear industry activity in four of the five areas listed above. The growth in the mitiga­tion of risks to nuclear security is the result of increased national and international assessments of the measures required to ensure effective security at Canada's major nuclear installations.

3. Implement improvement initiatives

Several new initiatives were developed this past year as a result of the growth in the regulatory pro­gram. The following is a discussion of the emerg­ing priorities, the initiatives and activities that were undertaken and the results achieved.

a. Nuclear power reactor refurbishment projects

Protecting the Canadian public

The CNSC protects the Canadian public by requiring nuclear facilities to meet both modern, high-level safety goals and regulatory requirements for secure operation. A nuclear power plant licence is evaluated and, if appropriate, amended with spe­cific conditions when the licensee undertakes a project to extend the life of a reactor. A licensee must adhere to the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, the associated regulations and licence conditions throughout a life extension project and subsequent reactor operation. Approval to return a reactor to service is contingent upon a licensee's demonstra­tion that it has met relevant licence conditions.

In keeping with its regulatory mandate, the CNSC expects a licensee to demonstrate that it meets the following objectives for any life extension project:

  1. Adequate determination of the technical scope of the project, through a safety improvement plan that considers results of an environmental assessment and an integrated safety review
  2. Establishment of programs and processes that take into account any special considerations of the project
  3. Appropriate project planning and execution

In May 2006, the CNSC issued the draft regulatory guide Life Extension of Nuclear Power Plants (G-360) for public consultation. The document includes information for licensees and other stakeholders on the licensing steps required to extend the oper­ating life of a power reactor. In particular, the guide notes that a licensee wishing to refurbish a nuclear reactor should perform an integrated safe­ty review based on the probabilistic safety assess­ment guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Many of Canada's nuclear power plants are nearing the end of their designated operating lives. During 2005-06, the CNSC received incremental funding from the government to manage the increase in workload to regulate licensee refurbishments of power reactors - including those at Bruce and Point Lepreau - and to regulate aging nuclear reactors (specifically, Units 2 and 3 at Pickering A).

Bruce Power

Units 1 and 2 at Bruce Nuclear Power Development's Bruce A site are being refurbished. CNSC staff have reviewed the licensee's integrated safety review report and safety improvement plan and are monitoring the implementation of these plans by the licensee. The CNSC is also overseeing the secure disposal of obsolete equipment and con­taminated parts being generated by the refurbish­ment program.

Pickering Nuclear Generating Station

Units 2 and 3 at the Pickering A Nuclear Generating Station are currently in a guaranteed shutdown state and will be placed in long-term safe storage. The licensee has decided that these units will not be refurbished. In 2006-07, CNSC staff were on site to verify that fuel and heavy water were removed from the reactors and stored accord­ing to IAEA standards. A number of licence amendments were required, due to the fact that some safety requirements, such as maintenance and testing, differ when units are operating versus when dormant.

During 2005-06, the CNSC received an applica­tion to undertake an environmental assessment for the proposed refurbishment of Pickering B's four reactors, that would extend their operating lives to 2060. As the sole responsible authority for the environmental assessment, the Commission reviewed the proposed approach and made a deci­sion as to the scope of the project and the assessment, in accordance with the requirements of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. The Commission first had to determine the scope of both the project and the assessment. CNSC staff also carried out and will continue to conduct pub­lic consultations, including workshops on the environmental effects of the proposed project, mit­igation measures and on the follow-up program.

Point Lepreau

In July 2006, the Commission granted a five-year licence renewal to New Brunswick Power Nuclear's Point Lepreau Generating Station, which is in the early stages of refurbishment. CNSC staff has reviewed the licensee's Integrated Safety Review report. Point Lepreau is planning a 2009 outage to complete the refurbishment, and the CNSC has developed its project plan for regulatory oversight of the refurbishment to coincide with this timing.

During 2006-07, the CNSC oversaw the start of the expansion of Point Lepreau's solid waste man­agement facility, which will store waste generated during refurbishment and throughout the extend­ed life of the facility.


Hydro-Québec is reviewing the possibility of refurbishing its Gentilly-2 nuclear reactor to extend its life to 2035, but has not yet made a deci­sion to do so. The CNSC staff directed the review of Hydro-Québec's Environmental Assessment Screening Report for proposed modifications to the Gentilly radioactive waste management facili­ties and refurbishment of the generating station, as a precursor to potential licensing of the refurbish­ment project. The Commission accepted the screening report in November 2006. CNSC staff also reviewed the licence amendments that would required for any subsequent application to proceed with the refurbishment of the generating station.

b. Uranium Mining, Research Facilities and Waste Management

Canada is the world's largest producer of uranium and there is increasing demand for production. There has been an increase in the number of new reactor projects throughout the world and a large number refurbishments of existing reactors that involve an increase in the total generating capacity of the reactors. This growth in activity and demand has resulted in a dramatic rise of the price of uranium on world markets. This growth in demand and rise in price has accelerated industry plans to expand existing mines and explore for new uranium sources. Although Canadian uranium is currently mined only in Saskatchewan, there are uranium exploration activities underway in virtu­ally every region of the country, which are expect­ed to lead to increased uranium mine applications.

With the potential for new uranium mining projects, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission developed and issued Licensing Process for New Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada (INFO-0759) in March 2007. This document provides an overview of the licensing process for new uranium mines and mills in Canada based on requirements of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act and its regulations, and it refers to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. It explains the major steps involved in the established regulatory process for licensing new uranium mines or mills. The document is aimed at a broad audience, encompassing those involved directly in uranium mine development as well as those with an interest in the federal regulatory regime that applies to ura­nium mining and milling. Probable timelines involved in the licensing process are described, as are the stages in the process where interested par­ties, including the public, can provide input in the decision-making process.

A major flood occurred in October 2006 at Cameco's Cigar Lake uranium mine in northern Saskatchewan. CNSC staff responded quickly dur­ing the incident to provide regulatory oversight while the licensee managed the flood. CNSC staff has since been reviewing the circumstances sur­rounding the flood, and Cameco presented an ini­tial report to the Commission in November 2006. Analysis of the root cause is ongoing, and CNSC staff has shifted some resources from oversight of the mine to focus on the recovery operations.

Also in 2006, the Commission decided that seleni­um, a contaminant in the effluent from Cameco's Key Lake Mill in Saskatchewan, was being released in concentrations and quantities that posed an unreasonable risk to the environment. CNSC environmental science experts determined through a scientific study, that cumulative releases of selenium exceeded those predicted in the licensing environ­mental assessment and posed a risk to the environ­ment. This finding stopped a proposed expansion of the Key Lake facility and the Commission Tribunal ordered that mitigating measures be taken to control environmental impacts. The CNSC scien­tific study on selenium was peer reviewed in the U.S. and in Canada. The study's results has implications for the uranium mining industry as a whole and will influence the future regulation of the Canadian uranium mining industry.

Monitoring the environmental effects of uranium mines

In 2002, the Government of Canada promulgated the Metal Mining Effluent Regulations (SOR/2002-22) under the Fisheries Act. The regulations set out requirements for mines to undertake environmental effects monitoring (EEM) to assess how assess how mines affect fish, fish habitats and the usability of fisheries resources.

The CNSC is a member of Environment Canada's Metal Mining EEM Review Team consisting of experts from government, industry, environmental and aboriginal communities, to undertake a review based on experiences from the first phase of monitoring. Monitoring of radionuclides and hazardous substances contaminants and their potential biological effects on the environment, has been a CNSC requirement for uranium mines since the 1990s.

Environmental monitoring experience at Canadian uranium mines was instrumental in influencing two recommendations from the national review team: the need to further investigate selenium releases in mine effluents and include selenium as a monitored effluent variable; and the importance of coordinating and linking the Environmental Assessment process with the design, implementation and interpretation of the Metal Mining Effluent Regulations environment effects monitoring programs. The CNSC is one of the few regulators to have implemented such an integrated approach to environmental protection, where results of environmental assessments are used to design environmental and effluent monitoring programs and interpret their results.

In September 2006, the Ministers of Environment and Health published the final decision on the Assessment of Releases of Radionuclides from Nuclear Facilities (impact on non-human biota) in Part I of the Canada Gazette. The finding reported that uranium and uranium compounds, contained in effluent releases from uranium mines and mills, are entering the environment in quantities or concentrations or under conditions that have or may have an immediate or long-term harmful effect on the environment or its biological diversity. The Ministers proposed to take no further action under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act in respect of this substance because the Nuclear Safety and Control Act enables the CNSC to protect non-human biota from such releases. A risk management process has been formalized in an annex to a memorandum of understanding negotiated between Environment Canada and the CNSC. CNSC environmental specialists have conducted numerous research studies to better understand the toxicity of uranium to aquatic organisms and to identify best available technologies for the treatment of uranium in effluent. The Commission required a licence condition in the Rabbit Lake Mine and Mill licence to identify and implement mitigation measures that would significantly reduce the amount of uranium discharged to the environment.

Nuclear waste management

The activities licensed by the CNSC generate the following types of waste, which are managed in various ways:

  • Uranium mine waste rock and mill tailings are disposed of in above-ground facilities or in pits
  • Low-level radioactive waste and radioactive waste requiring shielding, which arises from uranium processing plants, nuclear power plants, nuclear research facilities, and industrial and medical applications is stored in above­ground structures and in shallow in-ground structures
  • Highly radioactive nuclear fuel waste (spent fuel) is stored in water-filled bays or in various dry storage structures (dry storage casks, above­ground and in-ground concrete canisters, and modular above-ground vaults)

Additional possible approaches to long-term waste management include surface and near-surface facilities and deep geological facilities for disposal or long-term storage.

In addition to radioactive waste generated by licensed activities, legacy and historic waste from the early days of the nuclear industry (for example, closed uranium mines) falls under CNSC regula­tory oversight and is subject to CNSC licensing requirements.

Waste management systems for long-term storage and disposal of waste refer to the combination of natural and engineered barriers and operational procedures used to manage waste safely. Long-term assessment of these systems can provide information for making decisions concerning the following:

  1. Selection of an appropriate site (if more than one site is available)
  2. Site characterization
  3. Selection of a suitable design option during planning
  4. Optimization of selected design(s), including the minimization of operational and post-oper­ational impacts
  5. Development of construction, operation, and decommissioning strategies and plans

Recent growth in number and size of waste management facilities has required the CNSC to engage additional resources to meet the demands of licensing analysis and subsequent compliance oversight.

During the year, the CNSC provided regulatory oversight as New Brunswick Power Nuclear commenced construction of a long-term storage facility to handle the waste from its upcoming refurbishment of the reactor at Point Lepreau. In addition, the CNSC reviewed the project plan for construction and operation of additional storage structures at Hydro-Québec's Gentilly Radioactive Waste Management Facility in Bécancour, Québec.

CNSC staff appeared before the Commission regarding this project at a hearing in March 2007, and a licence amendment was granted shortly thereafter in April. The Commission also consid­ered Ontario Power Generation's licence renewal application for the Western Waste Management Facility, a dry storage facility that manages all of Ontario Power Generation's and Bruce Power's waste, including used reactor fuel, at the Bruce Power site in January 2007.

Port Hope Area Initiative

The environmental assessment for the Port Hope Area Initiative was approved. This is a Government of Canada initiative to clean up contaminated sites in the Port Hope Region by constructing facilities for long-term storage of historic low-level radioac­tive wastes.

Deep Geologic Repository

Ontario Power Generation has proposed a deep geologic repository that would be constructed within the Bruce Nuclear Power site in Kincardine, Ontario, and house low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes. The project requires a compre­hensive environmental assessment, and the CNSC, as the lead agency for the assessment, has been exploring the possible approaches. The Commission has announced its recommendation to the federal Minister of the Environment that the proposal be referred to a review panel. The Minister of the Environment will now decide on this recommendation. The CNSC consulted extensively on this project with the community, including the Saugeen Ojibway Nations.

New regulatory guide

In December 2006, the CNSC issued a regulatory guide to assist applicants for new licences and licence renewals in assessing the long-term safety of radioactive waste management. Assessing the Long-Term Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (G-320) describes approaches to assess the poten­tial long-term impact of radioactive waste storage and disposal methods on the environment and on the health and safety of people.

The regulatory guide addresses the assessment of long-term safety to support licence applications, and includes discussion of assessment methodolo­gies, structures, and approaches, which the CNSC will examine.

c. Licensing and Compliance of the Use of Nuclear Substances

The CNSC continues to address a rapidly growing number of Class II nuclear facilities, principally those for cancer treatment that use radiation ther­apy. The CNSC received increased resources to improve capacity for regulatory oversight of this industry sector. However, growth has been greater than projected.

The total number of radiation therapy facilities under CNSC licence increased by 15% from the preceding year. A major trend among Canadian radiation therapy centres over the past year has been the replacement of existing radiation therapy accel­erators with more technologically advanced ones. An estimated 10% of existing radiation therapy accelerators were replaced in this manner (see Figure 1). In addition to a continuation of this trend, the CNSC expects a significant increase in the number of new radiation therapy facilities in the upcoming fiscal year, with about 30 facilities expected to be in various stages of construction - most of which will begin routine operation towards the end of 2007-08 or early in the subsequent year.

Figure 1. Medical Licences for Linear Accelerators (linac)

Medical Licences for Linear Accelerators

During 2006-07, CNSC staff employed a system­atic, risk-informed approach to balance its review of new licence applications and with ongoing compliance verification activities to ensure the safety of Canadians. Rigorous safety reviews and independent verification of licensee submissions were routinely performed for all new construction applications, with on-site follow-up taking place when major projects or issues were identified. For facilities under active clinical use, a program of comprehensive bi-annual compliance audits was launched in March 2006, and 54 facilities were inspected during the 2006-07 fiscal year. Ongoing compliance of all licensed facilities was assessed by reviewing the annual compliance reports submitted by licensees.

Through risk-informed licensing of nuclear sub­stances and radiation devices, CNSC staff ensured effective regulatory control over the activities of all applicants and licensees. With this approach, CNSC staff continued to consistently apply regu­latory requirements to the more than 2,500 licensees of this type across Canada. CNSC also provided ongoing written and verbal information about the CNSC's expectations of applicants and licensees to ensure transparency and to promote understanding of regulatory obligations.

In July 2006, CNSC staff implemented a new licence format for nuclear substances and radiation devices and Class II facilities that standardized the layout and presentation of information in the licence. In addition to revising some licence condi­tions to increase clarity, new features were added, including the ability to reference licensee commit­ments as part of the licence itself. This change allowed licensees to propose alternate methods of achieving compliance with the regulatory frame­work and provided the basis for assessing compli­ance. Other changes were carried out to enhance security of information and changes to annual compliance reports, including their incorporation as part of the licence, further streamlining the reporting process for all licensees. Licensees have generally embraced these changes and have taken the opportunity to include specific procedures as part of their licences.

The number of each type of CNSC licence varies slightly from year to year. Since the end of the 2005 fiscal year, the total number of licences issued through the CNSC's Directorate of Nuclear Substance Regulation has increased more than 7%. This licensing work is directly influenced by changes and advances in various fields, such as medical diagnosis and therapy The use of radiation devices in industrial radiography is profoundly influenced by work in the oil and gas sector, par­ticularly in western Canada. While the number of industrial radiography licences has remained rela­tively stable, the need for regulatory oversight for this high-risk group continues to demand signifi­cant CNSC resources. As part of an overall strate­gy for ensuring continued effective control, the CNSC will be implementing a program to carry out an overall assessment and alignment of staff efforts in this area. This program aims to effective­ly coordinate work between CNSC staff and to provide additional measures to ensure the mandate of the CNSC is respected, through provisions for the health and safety of persons.

In high-risk uses or applications areas such as industrial radiography (usetype 812), the CNSC completed 100% of the planned annual regulatory compliance workload.

Each usetype has an assigned inspection frequency for Type II inspections, which when compiled, produces an annual workload figure. Almost all high risk usetypes undergo annual Type II inspections, except usetype 868 (borehole tube tagging), which has a two-year frequency; however, data in the graph has been normalized to show the workload for a single year.

Throughout the year, the CNSC staff continued to focus regulatory effort on radiography applications because these workers in this area continue to receive doses higher than other nuclear energy workers and have a track record of below-average compliance in the area of safety culture. CNSC regulatory efforts in the previous year have shown a decrease in the number of incidents and an associated reduction in radiation doses to workers. For portable gauge users, classified as medium risk, the CNSC com­pleted 85% of its annual regulatory compliance workload. Portable gauge users were also targeted through outreach and an enhanced compliance program. These concentrated regulatory efforts produced results with individual licensees in addi­tion to creating awareness within the industry.

The CNSC is also fostering compliance by engaging in dialogue with licensees through regulatory out­reach. There are also regular meetings with radiogra­phers that have resulted in increased attendance (more than 95% of CNSC radiography licensees) and enhanced participation. More than 90% of attendees asked for these meetings to continue.

The CNSC operations inspections division has trained or is in the process of training seven new inspectors and has therefore concentrated on Type II inspections. As staff is trained, a more balanced distribution of Type I and Type II inspections across usetypes can be maintained.

The CNSC's Directorate of Nuclear Substance Regulation tracks all licensing and certification activities. The following table summarizes the licensing and certification regulatory process for 2006-07.

Licensing and Certification Regulatory process: 2006-07
Licences Application Received 913
Renewed 728
Revised 925
Revoked 160
New 179
Device Certificates New 15
Renewed 1
Revised 20
Transport New Licence 154
Revised Licence 15
Certificate 53
Annual Compliance Report Received 2595

To monitor program effectiveness, CNSC performance standards were measured for each licensing and compliance program area. The target was to achieve 80% of these activities within published CNSC performance standards. Results are outlined in section 3 within Part IV of this report.

Nuclear substance events program

“Events” are unusual or unplanned occurrences with radioactive nuclear substances or prescribed equipment, which licensees must report to the CNSC within specific timeframes to comply with regulations or licence conditions. Some events, such as waste radiation alarms and scrap metal radiation alarms, are reported by non-licensees. The following table shows the number of events by type reported in each of the past three fiscal years.

Nuclear Substances Events by Fiscal Year

Événements mettant en cause des substances nucléaires - Par exercice
Event type 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
Action Level Exceeded1 0 1 3
Bankruptcy 0 1 0
Breach of Security2 2 1 1
Contamination Incident 5 10 6
Device Damaged 16 31 22
Device Malfunction 12 11 10
Dose Limit Exceeded to Nuclear Energy Worker 5 4 4
Dose Limit Exceeded to Non-Nuclear Energy Worker 3 2 5
Failed Leak Test 1 3 3
Fire or Explosion 4 0 3
Found Nuclear Substance 5 2 1
Loss3 13 12 11
Other 3 6 6
Procedure Error 5 3 4
Scrap Metal Alarm 37 14 14
Spill 2 8 4
Stolen4 7 7 6
Transportation Incident/MVA 19 12 27
Unauthorized Possession 0 1 0
Unauthorized Use 1 1 1
Waste Alarm 3 13 119
Work Disruption 0 3 2
Grand Total 143 146 252
  1. An action level is an administrative control level defined in the Radiation Protection Regulations that calls for investigation by the licensee and a report to the CNSC.
  2. For the purposes of nuclear substances events, a breach of security is an event where workers or the public entered a controlled radiation area without authorization. No dose was received.
  3. The 11 events were mitigated, except for 4 low-risk sources and 1 medium-risk device that were not recovered.
  4. The 6 events involved 9 radioactive sources, of which 3 were low-risk nuclear gauges that have not been recovered.

The preceding table shows a significant increase in the number of waste alarms in during 2006-07. The CNSC investigated the reasons for the increase in waste alarms, the majority of which originated in Southern Ontario. The reasons appeared to be as follows:

  • An increased awareness by waste site operators of CNSC regulatory jurisdiction over radioac­tive nuclear substances due to a CNSC outreach campaign of posters and pamphlets.
  • An increased number of municipal waste facili­ties and transfer stations (especially in the Toronto area) that have installed sensitive portal vehicle radiation monitoring systems.
  • An improvement in the quality and detection ability of the monitoring systems resulting in more alarms.

Once nuclear substances are detected, the facility operator informs the CNSC. In the rare event of a high level radiation alarm, an inspector will visit the site to investigate. More than 75% of waste alarms are due to the presence of small quantities of short-lived radioactive nuclear substances of medical origin, which pose little or no risk.

The CNSC has initiated a research study to estab­lish a risk-informed intervention strategy for the waste alarms.

d. Mitigating Risks to Nuclear Security

Amended Nuclear Security Regulations

The Commission introduced amendments to the Nuclear Security Regulations in Fall 2006. These amendments were based on previous documentation of best practices by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), along with CNSC consul­tation with licensees (through the Inter-Utility Security Working Group established in 2002), law enforcement and intelligence agencies and govern­ment. The amendments gave permanent codification to the requirements that were established after the terrorist events of September 2001, along with additional licensee security requirements. Principal security requirements resulting from the amend­ments, which apply to all nuclear power plants and high-risk facilities, were as follows:

  • Design basis threat analysis - to consider the postulated threat definition in the design of a licensee's physical protection system.
  • Threat and risk assessment - to evaluate local threats to a licensee's facility and to account for any credible threats in the design of their phys­ical protection system.
  • Identification and protection of vital areas - to identify and apply physical protection measures to a nuclear facility's high-risk areas.
  • On-site nuclear response force - to establish an armed, on-site response force that is available at all times for immediate and effective intervention.
  • Predetermination of trustworthiness - requires unescorted employees to have a security clear­ance or an authorization appropriate to their level of access, including police and intelligence background checks.
  • Responsibility for granting authorizations - to define the licensee's responsibility in authoriza­tion of access to facilities.
  • Access control - to have appropriate procedures and devices in place to positively identify and screen persons entering a nuclear facility.
  • Uninterrupted power supply (UPS) - to have an uninterrupted power supply (for example, back-up battery power) in place to maintain the operation of alarm systems, alarm assessment systems and various essential functions of the security monitoring room.
  • Contingency planning, drills and exercises - to validate physical protection systems through regular drills, and to develop and exercise con­tingency plans to manage anticipated security related emergencies.
  • Vehicle barriers and portals - to reduce the risk of forced vehicle penetration into a nuclear facility through physical measures.
  • Supervisor awareness program - to train super­visors to recognize behavioural changes in all facility personnel, including contractors, that may indicate an increase in risk to the security of the facility.

Sealed Source Tracking System

The CNSC is responsible for ensuring the safety and security of high-risk radioactive sources and it strengthened regulatory controls in 2006 by implementing a Sealed Source Tracking System within an upgraded national sealed source registry. Using a secure system, licensees must now report possession of and transactions involving sealed sources. Canada is the first country with such robust inventory tracking controls, and several countries are choosing to learn from the Canadian experience.

The tracking system has been a great success in ensuring that high-risk radioactive sources are used only for peaceful purposes. Canada is one of the world's largest suppliers of sealed sources. Licensees must report to the CNSC all imports, exports, receipts and transfers. The number of sources in the new registry exceeds 30,000, far greater than projected, and there have been over one million transfers of these goods. Resources were allocated in 2006-07 to educate holders of these sources in using an electronic tracking system that was introduced in July 2006. During 2006-07, 90% of the transactions were paper based, and more licensees are expected to use the electronic system in the future. Another element of the tracking is in export controls. At the end of 2006-07, the CNSC launched an enhanced Risk-Significant Sealed Sources Export and Import Controls Program, which enhanced the program for licensees wishing to export certain risk-significant radioactive sealed sources and the requirement to obtain transaction-specific export licences from the CNSC.

The implementation of the strengthened export and import controls program, together with an enhanced National Sealed Source Registry, assures Canadians and the global community that international transfers of risk-significant sealed sources are conducted and regulated appropriately for safety and security.

Increased CNSC security staff

Over the last five years since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the CNSC has increased its security staff, who include security inspectors and specialists who monitor and verify compliance in areas such as tactical response, security systems, personal security, and intelligence analysis. Implementation costs, the majority of which are borne by licensees, were significant.

Further steps

The adaptation of Canadian nuclear security to the post 9/11 world is continuing, and next steps include performance testing of security personnel and systems under realistic conditions, expanding internal intelligence analysis capabilities to relay information to licensees in a timely manner, and corollary technical standards and guidelines based on the amended security regulations.

The CNSC continues to receive information from CSIS, the RCMP, the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre and others. The CNSC followed potential threats to ensure effective response. This ongoing information, along with the international standards, is driving further security improvements for Canada's nuclear industry.

e. Creation of a Modern Regulatory Framework for Construction of New Nuclear Reactors in Canada

Given the receipt of two applications from Bruce Power and Ontario Power Generation for licences to prepare sites to build new power reactors, the CNSC was allocated funding to establish a New Reactor Licensing Division in 2006. These resources will enable the CNSC to develop the modern regulatory framework for licensing new reactors. Staff commenced preparation of the nec­essary framework and are working to document licensing requirements and provide guidelines to meet these requirements. This material builds upon many years of licensing and compliance experience with Canada's aging reactors and on international guidelines and experience in such areas as design, acceptable doses, failure processes and shutdown systems.

In February 2006, the CNSC issued Licensing Process for New Nuclear Power Plants in Canada (INFO-0756) to explain the key steps in licensing a new reactor, taking into consideration the requirements of the NSCA and its regulations. In March 2007, a supplementary document was pub­lished to elaborate upon the review of reactor designs within the licensing and environmental assessment processes for new nuclear power plants in Canada. Also in development are the design and siting requirements for new reactors that will be issued for public comment in 2007.

Many environmental assessments (EAs) in the coming years will be conducted as part of applica­tions to construct new nuclear power reactors. In a document released in February 2006, the CNSC clarified the EA process associated with the establishment new nuclear power plants. When the CNSC receives an application to prepare a site, this will trigger an EA under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act to determine if the project may cause significant, adverse environmen­tal effects, taking into account available mitigating measures. The Commission will not issue any licence until an EA is complete and has reached a positive decision. The EA will include considera­tion of potential environmental effects throughout the plant's life cycle. If an EA results in a negative decision, the licensing process for that project will stop.

The recent applications for licences to prepare a site for new reactors triggered environmental assessments that will require several years to com­plete. Site preparation will not commence until 2009, contingent upon assessment results. Bruce Power also submitted a project description in January 2007, which the CNSC has begun review­ing. Ontario Power Generation was expected to submit a similar document by April 2007.

The CNSC is also participating in the Multinational Design Evaluation Program, which is considering the extent to which regulators can cooperate in evaluating reactor designs. This is a pilot project, limited to a few technical areas, that is comparing the regulatory requirements from each of the participating countries and the regula­tory activities that would be undertaken to verify the requirements have been met. The program's long-term goal is to harmonize regulatory require­ments and regulatory practices. The group, which has representatives from 12 countries, is set up under the Nuclear Energy Agency.

Linda Keen, CNSC President and current President of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, met with the Governing Board of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) dur­ing its meeting in Québec City, Québec, in October 2006. This invitation from WANO, an industry organization created to improve safety at nuclear power plants around the world, was signif­icant, as regulatory authorities do not attend the organization's events. It afforded an exchange on the importance of considering safety in the opera­tion of existing nuclear power plants and of mod­ern regulatory frameworks in considering new nuclear power plants.

Through its continued role with the IAEA's Commission on Safety Standards, the CNSC's Executive Vice-President Ken Pereira advised on the finalization of the IAEA's Safety Fundamentals document that sets the umbrella framework for the IAEA's suite of safety standards and documenta­tion. This material is structured upon the follow­ing 10 safety principles: responsibility for safety; role of government; leadership and management for safety; justification of facilities and activities; optimization of protection; limitation of risk to individuals; prevention of accidents; emergency preparedness and response; and protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks. In September 2006, the IAEA's General Conference approved the publication, which will be significant to all of the world's regulators, including the CNSC, which ahas a commitment to adopting and adapting its regulatory framework to international standards. This commitment is in line with the Government of Canada's policy on regulatory streamlining.

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2 Type II inspections are routine (item-by-item) checks and rounds that typically focus on the outputs, or performance of licensee programs, processes and practices. Findings from Type II inspections play a key role in identifying where a Type I inspection may be required to determine systemic problems in licensee programs, processes or practices.

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