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National Sealed Source Registry and Sealed Source Tracking System Report for 2018

Sealed sources are radioactive nuclear substances encased in a sealed capsule or in a cover to which the substance is bonded. A source’s capsule or cover is strong enough to prevent contact with, or dispersion of, the substance under the conditions for which the capsule or cover is designed. Sealed sources can be used for a variety of activities, including medical, industrial, commercial, and academic and research applications. An inventory of sealed sources within Canada is housed in the National Sealed Source Registry (NSSR), which was established in 2006 to conform to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. The NSSR is used to maintain an accurate and secure inventory of sealed sources in Canada, with a particular focus on those classified as high risk.

The Sealed Source Tracking System (SSTS) is a secure information-management system used in conjunction with the NSSR to track new and existing high-risk sources within Canada. Source transfers done online through the SSTS update and populate the NSSR so that the information is as current as the licence reporting allows (e.g., reporting within two days of receipt and seven days in advance of any transfer). The CNSC places particular emphasis on capturing data on high risk sources, with the NSSR housing detailed information such as the source serial number, isotope, activity, and current location. Information on moderate- and low-risk sources is updated annually using the inventory data included in licensee's annual compliance reports (ACRs) and validated by the CNSC for accuracy and consistency.

Categories of sealed sources

Sealed sources are classified by the IAEA into five different categories:

Category 1

Very high risk
(risk-significant)

Category 2

High risk
(or risk-significant)

Category 3

Moderate risk

Category 4

Low risk

Category 5

Very low risk

For more information on how sealed sources are categorized, consult the CNSC website.

By the end of 2018, the NSSR contained information on 124,434 radioactive sealed sources in Canada. The SSTS actively tracks Category 1 and 2 sources. In 2018, 6,627 Category 1 and 61,571 Category 2 sources were tracked. The remaining 56,236 in the NSSR were Category 3, 4 or 5, which are not subject to mandatory tracking for every movement.

Sealed Source Inventory Trends

The number of sources located in Canada increases every year, mainly due to source manufacturers accepting returned sources for recycling, reuse and long-term storage. Figure 1 shows the total number of sealed sources, as well as the number of sealed sources in each category, that were accounted for in Canada on December 31, 2018. In 2018, there was an 8% increase in the number of high-risk sources compared to 2017, with the majority of the increase coming from the production of Category 2 sources. This is consistent with the year-over-year rate of increase since 2015. The increase in Category 3 sealed sources was primarily attributed to the return of sealed sources no longer suitable for use in prescribed equipment and to the decay of Category 2 sources held by licensees.

Figure 1. Breakdown of sealed sources in Canada on December 31, 2018
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total sources 79077 92831 100996 112543 124434
Category 1 5734 6748 6273 6260 6627
Category 2 39167 45673 51501 56970 61571
Category 3 28701 34899 37675 43784 50729
Category 4 224 200 293 258 251
Category 5 5251 5311 5254 5271 5256

Performance measures and verification

To gauge the effectiveness of the SSTS and verify the accuracy of the data in the system, CNSC inspectors physically cross-reference SSTS data against licensees’ actual inventory of sealed sources. Routine CNSC compliance inspections include the verification of sealed source tracking information. Inconsistencies are immediately addressed to ensure accuracy in the data.

In 2018, CNSC inspectors verified licensees’ compliance with sealed source tracking requirements during 116 inspections. Of these, licensees were compliant in 114 (98%) of cases. The two licensees that were initially found to be non-compliant have adequately addressed the issues identified during the inspections. The issues of non-compliance included an incomplete inventory in the NSSR/SSTS, and failure to notify the CNSC of exports within the required time frame.

For more information on inspection results of Canadian licensees using nuclear substances relative to doses to workers, radiation protection, operating performance and sealed source security, refer to the annual Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada.

Event mitigation

Licensees must immediately report lost or stolen nuclear substances to the CNSC and must also submit descriptions of any actions taken or proposed to recover missing nuclear substances. The CNSC investigates every such event and informs local, national, and international stakeholders who may assist with recovery. A list of events involving sealed sources can be found in the Lost or Stolen Sealed Sources and Radiation Devices Report.

The International Nuclear and Radiation Events Scale (INES) is a tool for communicating the safety significance of nuclear and radiological events to technical communities and the public. Every event reported from the commercial, academic and research, industrial, and medical sectors is classified in accordance with the INES, based on its safety significance rating. Of the following events, two events were rated as INES Level 1 (anomaly). All other events were rated as INES Level 0, which are considered below scale and have no safety significance.

Figure 2. INES rating descriptions
Events are classified at seven levels: Levels 1 to 3 are “incidents” and Levels 4 to 7 are “accidents”

A total of 87 sealed sources were involved in 19 events in 2018. Of these sources, 76 were lost (3 later recovered), 7 were stolen (5 later recovered), and 3 were found. These sources were classified as Category 4 or 5, which are low- to very low-risk.

Figures 3 and 4 present data on lost and stolen sources in Canada from 2014 to 2018.

Figure 3. Number of reported events involving, lost, stolen and found sealed sources from 2014 to 2018
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Lost/stolen 13 16 12 10 16
Found 3 1 3 1 3

Notes for figure 3:

  • No events involved Category 1 sources.
  • No events involved Category 2 sources.
  • No events involved Category 3 sources.
  • Five events involved a total of nine Category 4 sources. These are considered low-risk sources and are unlikely to be dangerous.
    1. Lost Category 4 source: A category 4 sealed source was lost when the package it was being transported in fell from the licensee’s vehicle. The licensee had also failed to properly secure the lid of the package, so the source was ejected from the package. A road maintenance crew discovered the package and the highway was closed for three hours. Ultimately, the source was located, recovered, and repackaged for transport back to the licensee’s facility. This event is now closed. CNSC staff issued an administrative monetary penalty to the licensee.
    2. Stolen Category 4 sources: There were four events in 2018 involving stolen sources.
      • A portable gauge with two sealed sources was stolen after being left unattended at a work site. The theft was reported to local authorities. The portable gauge has not been recovered. Based on the number and nature of the nuclear substances involved and the type of event reported, theft, this event was ranked as INES Level 1 (anomaly). However, because of the low-risk nature of the sources involved, this event does not pose a significant risk to the public or the environment.
      • A portable gauge with two sealed sources was stolen from a construction site. The theft was reported to local authorities. The portable gauge was recovered after a tip from an anonymous source. This event is now closed.
      • A portable gauge with two sealed sources was stolen from the back of a truck where it had been secured by the licensee. The theft, which occurred overnight while the truck was parked at a worker’s residence, was reported to local authorities. The portable gauge was recovered after the licensee was contacted by a member of the public. Following the incident, the licensee changed its protocols for storing portable gauges overnight. This event is now closed.
      • A vehicle containing a portable gauge containing one sealed source was stolen at knifepoint. The worker was not harmed. Local authorities were notified of the theft, and the gauge was recovered later that same day with no damage reported. The event is considered closed.
    3. Found Category 4 source: A fixed gauge containing a category 4 sealed source was discovered at a scrapyard using visual inspection and a hand-held monitor; the source activity was not high enough to set off the area monitors. CNSC staff determined that the fixed gauge likely belonged to a company that is now bankrupt. CNSC staff made arrangements with a licensed service provider to retrieve the device from the scrapyard and to arrange for its disposal. This event was ranked as INES Level 1 (anomaly). However, because of the low-risk nature of the source involved, this event did not pose a significant risk to the public or the environment. This event is now closed.
  • Fourteen events involved 77 Category 5 sources. These are considered very low risk and pose no danger because of their low activities, short half-lives or radiological nature. All these events were ranked as INES Level 0.
    1. Lost Category 5 sources:
      • In three cases, three sealed sources (one source in each case) used as radioactive seeds were not recovered following surgery. Licensees made efforts to find the seeds, but the searches were unsuccessful. The licensees involved have implemented corrective actions to minimize the chance of recurrence. In light of the negligible risk to the public and the environment, these events are considered closed.
      • In three cases, check sources used in medical facilities were lost after patient imaging. In one case, the source was found at the laundry facility and returned to the proper licensed location. In the second case, the source was lost in the hospital but was not recovered. In the third case, a patient left the hospital with the source still attached to their body. The hospital contacted the patient who searched their home, but the source could not be recovered. The three licensees involved in the events have introduced corrective measures and changed procedures to prevent recurrence. Due to the negligible risk to the public and the environment, these events are considered closed.
      • In two cases, licensees discovered that sources were missing from their inventory either after an internal inventory check or after a CNSC inspection. In both cases, the licensees looked for the missing sources but were unable to find them. The licensees implemented corrective actions to prevent future recurrences. Because of the negligible risk to the public and the environment, these events are considered closed.
      • A licensee reported 66 smoke detectors lost (1 source per smoke detector). The licensee believes the detectors are located within their controlled area, as the facility is equipped with detection monitors for waste leaving the facility, but has not found them. The licensee implemented corrective actions to prevent recurrence of this type of event. Due to the negligible risk to the public and the environment, the event is considered closed.
      • A portable gauge with one source was lost when the vehicle it was securely stored in was towed. The portable gauge was recovered. The event is considered closed.
    2. Found Category 5 sources: Two category 5 sources inside radiation devices were found outside of regulatory control
      • An old dew point tester containing a radioactive source was found by a non-licensee during the cleanup of a warehouse. A representative from the company that found the device made arrangements with a CNSC licensee to retrieve the device from the warehouse and arrange for its disposal. Due to the activity of the source, the risk to the public and the environment is considered very low. The event is considered closed.
      • A radiation source was discovered at a waste transfer facility when the radiation portal monitor alarm was triggered. The individual who collected the waste collects from various private properties, thus the radiation source has many potential points of origin. Local hazardous material response units were called to identify and secure the source, and to arrange for its disposal. Due to the activity of the source, the risk to the public and the environment is considered very low.
Figure 4. Number of lost or stolen sealed sources and recovered sealed sources from 2014 to 2018
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Lost/stolen Sources 40 35 24 17 84
Recovered Sources 11 15 10 4 8

Transaction statistics

The NSSR is populated by licensees reporting their transactions via the online SSTS interface or by other means (such as fax or email). Figures 5, 6, and 7 show transactions entered in the SSTS in 2018, statistics for import and export of sealed sources, and the percentage of online SSTS transactions from 2014 to 2018, respectively. The CNSC publishes SSTS transaction data as part of the Government of Canada’s Open Data initiative.

Figure 5. SSTS transactions in 2018
Transactions
Import 14307
Export 16999
Exchange 4210
Create 16303
Change 4681
Cancel 791
Transfer 5750
Receive 5844

Compared to 2017, licensees’ made fewer modifications to export and transfer dates in 2018, resulting in a 53 % decrease in the number of “change” transactions recorded for the year. This was the biggest contributor to the year-over-year drop number of transactions recorded in 2018.

  • Create: Creation of a new source manufactured in Canada
  • Exchange: Replacement of one source with another in a radiation device or Class II prescribed equipment at a licensed location
  • Export: Transfer of a sealed source from Canada to a foreign destination
  • Import: Transfer of a sealed source to Canada from a foreign location
  • Receive: Reception of sources by licensees at licensed locations
  • Transfer: A change in possession of a sealed source, from one licensee to another where both licensees are located within Canada, or the movement of a sealed source from one licensee's location to another, where both places are located within Canada.
  • Change: Transaction date change or correction
  • Cancel: Cancellation of transaction due to unforeseen circumstances (e.g., export and shipment cancellations, delayed transfers)

A total 68,885 transactions were recorded in 2018, which represents a 9% decrease compared to the number of transactions recorded in 2017.

Figure 6. Number of sealed source imports and exports from 2014 to 2018
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Number of sources imported into Canada 14307 14924 11577 14858 14307
Number of sources exported from Canada 19047 17029 17311 18491 16999

Users of nuclear substances in Canada routinely import and export sealed sources in accordance with their licences. There was a 9% decrease in the number of exports, and a 4 % decrease in the number of imports in 2018, compared to 2017. In 2018, there was a decrease in the number of sources exported by manufacturing companies, despite almost no change in the number of sources that were created.

Figure 7. Percentage of SSTS transactions completed online from 2014 to 2018
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Percentage of Web transactions relative to number of transactions 94 93 95 94 91

Licensees report transactions online (through the SSTS Web portal) or via email or fax to the CNSC. Transactions reported to the CNSC via email or fax are entered into the system by CNSC staff on behalf of the licensee.

In 2018, 91% of all transactions were done via the SSTS Web portal. This proportion is slightly lower than the previous four years.

Licensees’ continued use of the SSTS indicate that its implementation, as well as that of the NSSR, has been effective, and that Canada is maintaining its commitment to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

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