

Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Meeting held Wednesday, January 13, 2010 beginning at 1:30 PM at the Public Hearing Room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario.

Present:

M. Binder, President
M.J. McDill
C.R. Barnes
A. Graham
A. Harvey
R.J. Barriault
D.D. Tolgyesi

M. Leblanc, Secretary
J. Lavoie, Senior General Counsel
P. Reinhardt and S. Dimitrijevic, Recording Secretaries

CNSC staff advisors were: P. Elder, A. Régimbald, R. Buhr, P. Webster, F. Rinfret, D. Howard, R. Stenson, G. Frappier, M. De Vos, P. Hawley, M. Lord, W. Gibson and C. George

Other contributors were:

- Métaltec: D. Hébert
- Ontario Power Generation Inc: S. Seedhouse
- Hydro-Québec: C. Gélinas, M. Désilets and J.-G. Giguère
- Low Level Radioactive Waste Management Office: M. Gardner
- Natural Resources Canada: D. McCauley

Adoption of the Agenda

1. The revised agenda, CMD 10-M2.A, was adopted as presented.

Chair and Secretary

2. The President chaired the meeting of the Commission, assisted by M. Leblanc, Secretary.

Constitution

3. With the notice of meeting, CMD 10-M1, having been properly given and a quorum of Commission Members being present, the meeting was declared to be properly constituted.

4. Since the meeting of the Commission held December 9 and 10, 2009, Commission Member Documents CMD 10-M1 to CMD 10-M9 were distributed to Members. These documents are further detailed in Annex A of these minutes.

Minutes of the CNSC Meeting Held December 9 and 10, 2009

5. The Commission requested an update on item 43 of the draft Minutes regarding the guarantees of OPG with the Government of Ontario. CNSC staff responded that the agreement was still undergoing approval by the Province. CNSC staff added that it will inform the Commission of the eventual approval of this agreement, and that the agreement would have to be signed by the Commission as well.
6. The Commission Members approved the minutes of the December 9 and 10, 2009, Commission Meeting without changes.

STATUS REPORTS

Early Notification Reports

Early Notification of Operational Event/Condition

Métaltec: Possible overexposure of a gamma radiography operator to radiation

7. Regarding point 4.1.1 of CMD 10-M4, CNSC staff presented information concerning the possible radiation overexposure of a gamma radiography operator. CNSC staff reported that an exposure device operator employed by Métaltec had dropped his personal dosimeter and another direct dosimetric monitoring device that he was wearing, while performing industrial gamma radiography work with another Métaltec employee (trainee). The operator did not retrieve either device but carried on with his work. After the initial exposure, the operator did not retract the radioactive source back into the exposure device in the safe, shielded position. To prepare for the second exposure, he changed the exposure film and repositioned the collimator by hand, not realizing that the source was still in the collimator. When he noticed that the source was still in exposure mode, he retracted the source and stopped the work.
8. CNSC staff added that Métaltec had submitted an event report and suspended the worker indefinitely without pay. The report stated that the estimated whole body dose to the operator was 15.23 millisieverts (mSv), bringing his cumulative dose for 2009 to 31.59 mSv. The regulatory annual whole body dose limit for a nuclear energy worker is 50 mSv. Métaltec calculated a dose to the hands without shielding as being 1044 mSv. The regulatory annual limit for hands is 500 mSv.

9. CNSC staff noted that the trainee wore his personal dosimeter at all times and that Métaltec estimated his whole body dose at 3.8 mSv. CNSC staff added that Métaltec had sent the trainee's dosimeter to National Dosimetry Services and that the results showed that the trainee had received a whole body dose of 2.83 mSv, well below the regulatory limit.
10. CNSC staff also noted that, after reviewing all the information provided, they had asked Métaltec for additional information about the assumptions and calculations on which the operator's dose was based. Métaltec's response was still pending and CNSC staff planned to reappear before the Commission with the results and recommendations, once the investigation had been completed.
11. Métaltec confirmed the report and noted that the operator showed no symptoms of acute radiation exposure and was now available to respond to questions from CNSC staff.
12. The Commission asked whether the dosimeter had been properly secured. Métaltec responded that, as a result of the incident, it had changed the pockets used to keep the dosimeters on the clothing and provided employees with belts to attach the dosimeters. CNSC staff responded that they were assessing the measures introduced by Métaltec.
13. The Commission asked what kind of training company employees received, whether the employee concerned had received such training and, if so, when. Métaltec responded that they had established a training system under which the employee concerned had received in-house radiation protection training in February 2009, adding that the latter had four years of experience in radiography.
14. The Commission also asked whether the nature of the training was equivalent to that generally given in this type of business. CNSC staff responded that the training program referred to in the licence had been adjudged appropriate and that it would check whether other corrective measures should be recommended to the licensee.
15. In response to the Commission's request for comments on skills testing on an operator with the company, Métaltec explained that the operator in question had been audited approximately 15 times in 2009 and that no major objection had been noted concerning his work.

ACTION

16. The Commission questioned employee motivation to report an accident when a potential consequence was suspension without pay. Métaltec agreed that employee suspensions did not encourage others to report incidents and explained that the employee had been suspended after violating several safety rules. CNSC staff added that the licensee is required to release from duty a person who has, or may have, received a higher dose than the allowed limit, adding that there are no regulatory obligations regarding suspension with or without pay.
17. The Commission asked whether the case had been reported to the Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (CSST). Métaltec responded that the case had not been reported to the CSST. The Commission stated that it should be reported to the CSST for employee follow-up. CNSC staff responded that there is no requirement from the Commission to report the case to the CSST. The Commission acknowledges that CNSC staff has no obligation or responsibility regarding the reporting of an incident to the CSST.
18. The Commission asked whether a previous incident¹ in Manitoba had been reported to the appropriate provincial authorities. CNSC staff responded that they would locate the information and pass it on to the Commission.
19. The Commission asked whether Métaltec had submitted a full report on the event. CNSC staff responded that, while they had received a report identified as a final incident report, they still had questions concerning the scenarios and assumptions used to calculate doses.

ACTION

Early Notification of Operational Event/Condition: *Ontario Power Generation: Darlington Nuclear Generating Station Water Release*

20. With reference to item 4.1.2 of CMD 10-M4, CNSC staff presented information regarding a release of demineralised water to the environment. Some of the released water drained into Lake Ontario. The water contained very low concentrations of tritium and hydrazine. CNSC staff stated that an incorrect line-up of other valves caused lake water to be pumped to the Injection Water Storage Tank (IWST), which is part of the Emergency Coolant Injection (ECI) System. The IWST overflowed, partly to a sump inside the building and partly to grade from where the water made

¹ *Record of Proceedings, Including Reasons for Decision and Order "Opportunity to Be Heard on the Designated Officer Order Issued to Canadian Sub-Surface Energy Services Inc. on August 31, 2009,"* Hearing Date: October 21, 2009.

- its way into yard drains that discharge to the lake. CNSC staff added orally during the Meeting that the outside surface of the tank has been examined; there was no evidence of growth in the pre-existing cracks in the concrete and there was no evidence of damage as a result of the spill.
21. CNSC staff stated that no workers or members of the public have been affected by the event, and that there was no significant impact on the environment.
 22. OPG informed the Commission that a root cause investigation was under way and that it had taken action to prevent reoccurrence of the event. The Commission asked about the cause of the event. OPG answered that the operator applied a procedure that was prepared incorrectly, and that the verifier also missed the error in the procedure.
 23. The Commission sought more information on the level of contamination in the tank. OPG responded that the tritium contamination level was 1200 micro curies per litre, which corresponds to approximately 250 curies of tritium spilled into the drainage system. Asked to comment on the environmental effects of this spill, CNSC staff responded that sampling of the water treatment plants in the area revealed no increase above the typical background level of about 12 becquerels per litre, and that CNSC staff does not regard it as significant to either the environment or to public health. The drinking water guidelines are at 7 000 becquerels per litre.
 24. CNSC staff further confirmed that water treatment plants in the area were alerted and daily samples were taken. None of the samples showed a statistically significant increase in radioactivity beyond the background level.
 25. The Commission inquired if there were plans for periodical leakage tests. OPG responded that it has a periodic inspection program and that tests are done and results reported to CNSC staff on a regular basis.
 26. The Commission further asked if there were any plans for additional or more frequent inspections, or for numerical modeling or internal inspections by camera. OPG responded that it has entered into a technical operability evaluation of the tank to ensure that the tank was fit for duty based on the non-standard event that had occurred.

27. The Commission asked about communication with the public and about public reaction to the event and OPG's actions. OPG responded that its conservative decision to activate the site management centre and enter into radioactive liquid emission procedures ensured a rigorous approach and proper communications with the authorities and with the public. OPG added that it had an extensive communication with local and some larger media and that it had received positive feedback for its openness. The Commission expressed its satisfaction with OPG's prompt reaction and proactive disclosure of the event.

Early Notification of Operational Event/Condition

Hydro-Québec: Heavy water spill at Gentilly-2

28. CNSC staff presented information concerning a heavy water spill at Gentilly-2. During maintenance operations on a fuel loading machine system pump in the reactor building, approximately 3-4 litres of heavy water were spilled. The alarm was triggered and the workers left the building. A clean-up crew recovered the water that had spread over the basement floor where the spill occurred. A preliminary assessment established that the workers involved received a low dose from the tritium release.
29. Hydro-Québec (H-Q) stated that the operation involved draining the body of a heavy-water pump by blowing in compressed air. During the drainage operation, the container appeared insufficient for the quantity of water being drained and the employee tried to stop the airflow and move the hose into a second container, at which point the heavy water spilled onto the ground. H-Q added that it was investigating the exact cause of the event and that measures would be taken to prevent a recurrence of this error.
30. The Commission asked whether there was a written procedure for this operation and whether this type of operation was common practice in other generating stations. H-Q responded that a written procedure existed and that a similar operation was common practice elsewhere.
31. The Commission also asked whether the alarm was triggered automatically and whether the reactor was shut down during the alarm. H-Q responded that the alarm was for one area and that the reactor was not shut down.
32. The Commission asked what became of the spilled water. H-Q responded that the water was collected and reconcentrated, rather than being sent to the drain.

Status Report on Power Reactors

33. With reference to CMD 10-M6, which includes the Status Report on Power Reactors, CNSC staff presented updates on the following Nuclear Generating Stations (NGS):
- Bruce A and B;
 - Pickering A and B;
 - Darlington;
 - Gentilly-2; and
 - Point Lepreau.
34. CNSC staff reported in its submission that units 1 and 2 of Bruce A NGS were in refurbishment outage with planned restart in early 2011 and late 2010, respectively. CNSC staff also noted that the Operating Licence for Bruce A and B NGS expires on October 31, 2014.
35. CNSC staff added that Bruce A, Unit 3, was in a forced outage to make a permanent engineering fix to some of the injection valves.
36. CNSC staff further reported in CMD 10-M6 that unit 4 at Pickering A NGS had been in a forced outage due to Zone 2 controller problem, and was returning to service. CNSC staff noted that the refurbishment of Pickering B is not currently approved by OPG Board.
37. CNSC staff's CMD provided further details regarding the refurbishment outage at Point Lepreau and noted that the Commission Hearing for fuel reload has been postponed until spring 2010 to allow more time for core reassembly.

Updates on items from previous Commission proceedings

SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc. (SRBT): SRBT Status on meeting its financial commitments for the period of November 25 to December 22, 2009

38. With reference to CMD 10-M5 regarding the updates to items from previous Commission proceedings, CNSC staff, in its written submission, informed the Commission that SRBT is meeting its financial commitments, and is up-to-date with payments for the Decommissioning Escrow Account.

INFORMATION ITEMS

Hydro-Québec: Update on Gentilly-2 Nuclear Generating Station Refurbishment Project

39. Regarding CMD 10-M7.1, Hydro-Québec (H-Q) reported on its progress in preparations for the Gentilly-2 Nuclear Generating Station (NGS) refurbishment, describing the key project components and explaining the principal stages in each component.
40. H-Q informed the Commission that the refurbishment project came under the responsibility of H-Q Production and that project management was assigned to H-Q's Équipement division, as prime contractor for the refurbishment, adding that the Point Lepreau procedures provided useful operational experience.
41. The Commission asked how much time was allocated for unexpected/unforeseen circumstances in the NGS refurbishment. H-Q responded that it was continually reviewing and validating its planning, based on developments at Point Lepreau and Wolsong, South Korea and that it was perhaps premature to respond to the question.
42. The Commission asked whether the project was certain to be continued. H-Q responded that, while the project had been approved, several control points would be built into the preparation and execution phases.
43. The Commission asked why more extensive decontamination techniques were used at Gentilly-2 than at Point Lepreau. H-Q responded that, for several years, the radiation level at Gentilly-2 had been five times higher than at Point Lepreau and that H-Q committed to Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), a participant to the project, to reduce the level to that of Point Lepreau.
44. The Commission requested additional information on the replacement of control computers by emulators, noting that projects at Flamanville, France and in Finland had encountered problems with digital controls. H-Q responded that improved versions would be used in this project and that the nuclear industry's experience in the use of emulators was positive.

45. The Commission asked where the turbine rotors and feeder pipes were coming from and requested information on the development of new tools. H-Q replied that the rotors were made by General Electric and the pipes composed of the same alloy as that used at Point Lepreau. H-Q added that all the tools had already been developed and that they would use the same toolkit as the one used at Point Lepreau NGS, making modifications based on industry experience and using those already introduced in South Korea.
46. The Commission asked whether the planned refurbishment start sometime in early 2011 would depend on the Point Lepreau refurbishment. H-Q responded that, in the initial months of the outage, activities would depend on station manpower. Subsequently, the initial dismantling would be spread over six or seven months. H-Q added that the dismantling crew and the necessary tools were already available and that the first phase could proceed quickly.
47. The Commission asked how long the outage would last and what the project budget would be. H-Q responded that the planned outage period was 20 months, while the refurbishment project budget was approximately \$2,000,000,000.
48. The Commission also asked whether H-Q had to finance the replacement power, as Point Lepreau had done. H-Q responded that, since the replacement power was managed by H-Q and new hydro-electric generating stations would be coming online, it would not be necessary to finance replacement power.
49. The Commission enquired about consultation with Aboriginal peoples and their interest in participating. H-Q responded that it was proactive toward the Aboriginal communities and had contacted the Wôlinak and Odanak communities. H-Q explained that representations had been made to the community and that Wôlinak had participated on occasion, adding that two representatives of Odanak had participated in a liaison committee the previous fall.
50. The Commission asked whether the gas plant, located close to the NGS, had sufficient capacity to ensure the latter's continued operation in case of a power failure. H-Q responded that the gas plant capacity of about 400 megawatts was sufficient.
51. The Commission asked whether the agreement between H-Q and New Brunswick would affect the refurbishment. H-Q responded that it was trying to allow Point Lepreau to carry on operations without creating disruptions for them.

Update on Historic Contaminated Lands Exemption

52. With reference to CMD 10-M8, CNSC staff presented the first tri-annual update on the status of historic contaminated lands, which are clustered in three areas across Canada: Port Hope, the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), and along the Northern Transportation Route (NTR).
53. These sites were granted an exemption from licensing under section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*² (NSCA) in 2006. The sites of concern meet the requirements of section 11 of the *General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations*³ (GNSCR) which prescribes the conditions under which the Commission may grant an exemption. The exemption from section 26 of the NSCA is effective until December 31, 2016, with the condition that CNSC staff updates the Commission on the status of the sites every three years.
54. CNSC staff presented a list of the exempted sites and reported on site conditions. CNSC staff also presented its assessment of the exempted sites, and its conclusions that the circumstances have not changed since 2006.
55. CNSC staff stated that the sites of concern continue to be subjected to institutional controls. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Office (LLRWMO) of AECL has managed the Port Hope sites under various programs. These sites are currently being included in cleanup plans under the Port Hope Area Initiative.
56. CNSC staff added that the GTA sites are monitored regularly by LLRWMO staff and that all modifications to the properties are reviewed and monitored as required by the LLRWMO. Two of the sites listed under the exemption have been removed from the list since 2006 as they are below the regulatory thresholds. CNSC staff further noted that there is no specific long-term plan for the remaining sites as they do not pose a risk if left as is.
57. The Commission asked about the origin of contamination at locations in downtown Toronto. CNSC staff responded that all of these sites were radium-226 contaminated and that they are clustered very closely or within the buildings where radium painting operation had taken place. CNSC staff added that all contamination is fixed and secured behind extra walls, and that under current conditions, there is no risk to building occupants.

² *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, S.C. 1997, c. 9

³ *General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations*, S.O.R.\2000-202

58. The Commission inquired on the public awareness of radioactive contamination of the sites in Toronto. CNSC staff stated that the city authorities, building owners and some tenants are aware of contamination, and that they witness all periodical inspections.
59. The Commission sought more information regarding potential contamination by uranium-236 of some sites at Port Hope. CNSC staff responded that isotopic analyses of air, soil and water releases did not show any uranium-236. CNSC staff explained that depleted uranium, by-product of uranium enrichment, contains increased concentration of uranium-238, but not uranium-236. CNSC staff added that the isotopic composition of uranium has very little impact on possible health issues.
60. The Commission sought more information about contaminated sites within the Town of Port Hope and on public concern that some of the sites have not been examined. LLRWMO responded that those sites have been developed over many years and that it has in place a construction monitoring program to ensure the movement of contaminated soils within the Municipality of Port Hope.
61. The Commission asked if there were more identified contaminated sites along the NTR that are not licensed, besides the ones included in the presented list. CNSC staff responded that it was unaware of any other sites across Canada.
62. The Commission inquired about the origin of the legal obligation to clean up the sites and asked if there was a budget associated with this activity. NRCan representative responded that in 1982, when the LLRWMO was created, the Federal Government had recognised an obligation to address these historic wastes that were not being managed in an appropriate manner. The annual funding of the LLRWMO is provided through the NRCan budget to carry out its activities. NRCan added that additional funding is requested for specific campaigns.
63. With respect to the role of the CNSC, CNSC staff responded that the obligation of the CNSC is to ensure that the NSCA and the associated regulations are enforced and that the health and safety of the public and the environment are ensured.
64. The Commission expressed its expectation that the exempted sites would be cleaned by the end of the exemption period in 2016. NRCan expressed the same expectation and stated that it does not anticipate problems in funding the required activities.

Proposed Development of RD-367 “Design Requirements for Small Reactors” and RD-308 “Deterministic Safety Analysis for Small Reactors”

65. With reference to CMD 10-M9, CNSC staff presented information about the following two regulatory documents:
- RD-367 “*Design Requirements for Small Reactors*”, and
 - RD-308 “*Deterministic Safety Analysis for Small Reactors*”.
66. CNSC staff informed the Commission on its plans to develop these documents as a response to an interest, expressed by a number of stakeholders, in the production and application of small reactors of different types and powers. CNSC staff explained that the purpose of RD-367 is to provide potential applicants with the CNSC expectations regarding design requirements. It would apply to all the reactors below 200 megawatts thermal power whether they are used for research, isotope production, steam production or small electrical power. RD-308 would provide the requirements associated with Deterministic Safety Analysis needed for these small reactors to be approved and would set out the technical criteria against which CNSC staff would review these safety analyses.
67. CNSC staff explained the anticipated steps towards the implementation of these documents. The first step would be a technical workshop with interested stakeholders, scheduled for March 1, 2010. During this workshop, CNSC staff would provide an overview of the overall intended content of the two documents and seek feedback on some specific topics. The following step would include an information session that would be of interest to a broader set of parties. In doing so, other stakeholders could get better informed and provide more input during the formal consultation process. As a final step, CNSC staff would undertake a round of public consultations.
68. CNSC staff stated that both RD-308 and RD-367 would permit a graded approach, particularly applicable to small reactors that include a wide range of designs and power levels. CNSC staff said that it has always practised such a graded approach consistent with international practice on the licensing of small reactor facilities. The graded approach recognises that, depending on a number of factors that influence the risk of the facility, not all requirements need to be implemented in the same way for all facilities.

69. The Commission asked about the workshop and criteria for invitation, and suggested that there might be more interested parties that were not included in the invitation list. CNSC staff responded that for the first workshop it has invited parties that have already expressed interest for small reactors, and that a much broader audience would have an opportunity to participate in commenting on the documents during the wide public consultation process that would take place after the workshop.
70. The Commission sought more information on environmental assessment, security issues, Aboriginal consultations and other issues important for the licensing process. CNSC staff responded that the documents include primarily engineering design requirements. The Commission expressed its view that technical issues could not be separated from licensing, since decision making will be brought together, particularly regarding environmental assessments.
71. The Commission inquired into influence of technological diversity on regulatory approach, taking into account the number of existing reactor technologies of small reactors. CNSC staff responded that there may be different requirements for safety analysis because of the uniqueness of design of certain reactors, but overall they should all be captured by the RD-308 document.
72. The Commission pointed out that small reactors are already in use and asked if information on existing small reactors would be used and included in the documents. CNSC staff responded that the existing data will be used as an input and added that the regulatory framework already exists, and that the goal is to modernize it.
73. The Commission expects to receive a final version of the documents by November 2010.

ACTION
by
November
2010

DECISION ITEMS – REGULATORY DOCUMENTS

Regulatory Document RD-336, *Accounting and Reporting of Nuclear Material*

74. With reference to CMD 09-M63 and CMD 09-M63.A, CNSC staff presented Regulatory Document RD-336 on Accounting and Reporting of Nuclear Material for the Commission's approval.
75. CNSC staff stated that RD-336 updates how nuclear material, which includes uranium, plutonium and thorium, is accounted for and reported on in Canada.

76. CNSC noted that there were three main reasons why RD-336 was needed:
- a commitment made by Canada to the IAEA as an element of the “Broad Conclusion” from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2005, which placed on CNSC some expectations to require licensees to report in a standardized reporting format nuclear material and activities;
 - the current nuclear material accounting requirements do not address specific accounting of uranium, thorium, and plutonium to a level that ensures that Canada can meet its bilateral nuclear non-proliferation obligations;
 - the most recent revision of the accounting requirements pertaining to uranium, plutonium and thorium, occurred in 1988 and needs to be updated.
77. CNSC staff added that Canada's obligations in satisfying the IAEA on nuclear safeguards have evolved and needed to be updated in a new document.
78. CNSC staff noted that there are currently 37 CNSC licensees that already have safeguards licence conditions requiring specific accounting of uranium, plutonium and thorium. CNSC staff added that these licences will have to be amended to incorporate RD-336 requirements, possibly by the end of the calendar year.
79. CNSC staff reported that the document was published for a 90-day comment period in 2006. CNSC staff noted that 245 comments were received from eight organizations and one private individual, and that they are addressed in the latest draft of the document.
80. CNSC staff noted that it would provide a trial version of a Guidance Document GD-336 to the affected licensees to help them with the implementation of RD-336 requirements very soon after its approval. CNSC staff added that, during the transition period, it would also hold several outreach sessions with the stakeholders on these requirements and would finalize GD-336 before January 1st, 2011.
81. The Commission asked CNSC staff if most of the comments were addressed to the stakeholders’ satisfaction. CNSC staff responded that most of the stakeholders’ comments had to do with clarity of explanation and that a great effort had been deployed to clarify the requirements.
82. The Commission asked if a standard reporting form has been developed for the licensees. CNSC staff responded that several forms have been developed and that they will be released under GD-336.

APPENDIX A

CMD	DATE	File No
10-M1	2009-12-14	(6.02.01)
Notice of Meeting of January 13, 2010		
10-M2	2009-12-30	(6.02.02)
Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission to be held on Wednesday, January 13, 2010, in the Public Hearing Room, 14 th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario		
10-M2.A	2010-01-07	(6.02.02)
Updated agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission to be held on Wednesday, January 13, 2010, in the Public Hearing Room, 14 th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario		
10-M3	2010-01-11	(6.02.04)
Approval of Minutes of Commission Meeting held December 9 and 10, 2009		
10-M4	2009-12-29	(6.02.04)
Early Notification Reports: - Metaltec: Possible radiation overexposure of a gamma radiography operator - Ontario Power Generation: Darlington Nuclear Generating Station Water Release		
10-M5	2009-12-29	(6.02.04)
Updates on items from previous Commission proceedings: SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc. (SRBT) : SRBT Status on meeting its financial commitments for the period of November 25 to December 22, 2009		
10-M6	2010-01-06	(6.02.04)
Status Report on Power Reactors Units as of January 6, 2010		
10-M7.1	2009-12-24	(6.02.04)
Hydro-Québec: Update on the Refurbishment Project for Gentilly-2 Nuclear Generating Station		
10-M8	2009-12-24	(6.02.04)
Update on Historic Contaminated Lands Exemption – Oral presentation by CNSC staff		
10-M9	2009-12-24	(6.02.04)
Proposed Development of RD-367 “Design Requirements for Small Reactors” and RD-308 “Deterministic Safety Analysis for Small Reactors – Oral Presentation by CNSC staff		
09-M63	2009-11-20	(1-8-8-336)
Regulatory Document RD-336, Accounting and Reporting of Nuclear Materials (for approval) – Oral presentation by CNSC staff		
09-M63.A	2009-12-01	(1.03.02)
Regulatory Document RD-336, Accounting and Reporting of Nuclear Materials (for approval) – Oral presentation by CNSC staff – Supplementary Information		